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ARTICLE
All hands on deck: levels of dependence between the EU and
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and Ewa Mahr a
aFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands; bBelgrade Centre
for Security Policy, Belgrade, Serbia; cDepartment of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University,
Roskilde, Denmark
ABSTRACT
The EU seeks extensive partnership with other international orga-
nizations when it comes to security challenges. This is puzzling as
the EU relies for its resources mostly on its member states. The
relations between the EU and other international organizations
have thoroughly been studied, yet scholars rarely question the
actual rationale for partnership. We start from resource depen-
dency theory which explains that almost all organizations are
dependent on the resources of their partners. Yet we extend this
theory by distinguishing between macro, meso and micro-level
dependencies. To illustrate resource dependencies between the
EU and other international organizations, we analyse EU’s peace-
building policies in Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. By accounting for
macro- and micro-level dependencies we provide a more holistic
perspective than conventional meso-level explanations. Our con-
tribution is therefore to expand the scope of the resource depen-
dency theory and provide a framework to analyse dependencies
between the EU and other international organizations.
KEYWORDS
European Union;
international organizations;
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dependence; peacebuilding
1. Introduction
Partnership with other international organizations (IOs) has long been a key objective of
the European Union (EU) in addressing international security challenges. As the EU Global
Strategy (European Union 2016, 18) states ‘[t]he EU will be a responsible global stake-
holder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Co-
responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order’. The
Joint Communication on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach (High Representative and
European Commission 2013, 11) similarly notes ‘the EU needs to engage and work
together with other international and regional actors. The role of the EU is linked – to
a greater or lesser extent – to the action (or non-action), resources and expertise of others’.
How organizations interact with other organizations has long been a topic of inquiry in
sociology. Resource dependency theory, in particular, notes that to fulﬁl their mandates,
almost all organizations are dependent on the material and immaterial resources of their
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partners (e.g. Levine and White 1961; Benson 1975; Pfeﬀer and Salancik 1978). While some
scholars have used resource dependency theory to explain the relations between IOs
(Harsch 2015; Biermann and Harsch 2017), the extent to which the EU seeks partnership
with other IOs remains puzzling. After all, the EU and other IOs are normally dependent for
their resources on their members rather than on other organizations (Patz and Goetz 2019).
In addition, if the EU gets resources from other IOs, member states will lose some of their
control over the organization. We are thus left with the question why the EU focuses so
much on partnerships when it comes to addressing security challenges.
Surprisingly, this question is not extensively addressed. The preference for partner-
ships is often assumed. Scholars focus on why the EU and other IOs are (not) successful
in coordination (Tardy 2005; Morsut 2009; Dursun-Ozkanca 2010; Rein 2015; Gebhard
and Smith 2015). They identify obstacles for interaction (Stewart 2008; Biermann 2008;
Smith 2011; Gebhard and Smith 2015) and they discuss whether the mode of interaction
can be conceptualised around cooperation, competition and conﬂict (Duke 2008; Brosig
2011, 2014; Van Willigen and Koops 2015). The main contribution of this article is
therefore to reconsider resource dependency perspectives to provide a more nuanced
explanation as to the reasons behind the EU’s preference for partnership.
This article argues that although resource dependency theory provides an important
starting point, we need a broader conceptual model to better account for the explana-
tory factors behind the EU’s preference for partnerships. In particular, we argue that we
need to distinguish between macro, meso and micro-level dependencies. At the macro-
level, the EU operates independently from other IOs to achieve its formal mandate, but
requires the success of other IOs to achieve broader objectives. At the meso-level, the EU
and other IOs contribute directly to the achievement of each other’s mandates.
Resources are exchanged in a regulated, institutionalised, manner according to prede-
ﬁned inter-organizational agreements. At the micro-level, the EU and other IOs contri-
bute on an ad hoc basis allowing each of them to better implement their mandates. This
conceptual model provides a more holistic view on dependency.
To illustrate how resource dependence works at these levels, this article illustrates the
dependencies between the EU and other IOs in the area of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding
refers to the stages in the conﬂict cycle after violent conﬂict (war) has ended (Ramsbotham,
Woodhouse, andMiall 2011, Figure 5.1). It therefore covers much of what the EU does in the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP), mediation and dialogue activities and also
includes project funding, such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and
part of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance.1 Many of the activities of the EU’s
partners, including the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), also fall under peacebuilding. While peacebuilding in post-conﬂict coun-
tries is a policy area in which many IOs normally interact (McEvoy 2017), macro, meso and
micro-level dependencies are also present in other areas, such as development, humanitar-
ian assistance, environment, human rights and non-proliferation.
This article compares macro, meso and micro-level resource dependencies in the cases
of Kosovo, Mali and Armenia. In Kosovo, the EU is the lead international actor in
peacebuilding and its commitment is multi-dimensional and long-term. In Mali, the EU
is a key supporting actor to the UN. While it has deployed military and civilian opera-
tions, its commitment is more narrow than in Kosovo. In Armenia it is a secondary actor.
While the EU engages in peacebuiling, it does not have a CSDP presence and Armenia
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itself is strongly dependent on Russian support. In these cases, the EU correspondingly
uses a variety of peacebuilding instruments (CSDP, neighbourhood policy, pre-
enlargement policy). Such variation provides us with insights to relevant dependencies
on partners. These cases show that while macro-level dependencies can clearly be
identiﬁed and are often explicitly acknowledged, the EU and other IOs ﬁnd it particularly
diﬃcult to establish institutionalised resource exchange at the meso-level. At the micro-
level, the cases reveal a plethora of informal one-oﬀ instances in which the EU and other
IOs support one another. These case studies are informed by empirical data from 29
interviews2 and relevant secondary sources.
This article starts with an overview of resource dependence theory and makes a case
why we need to consider diﬀerent levels of dependencies. It continues by providing
empirical examples of such dependencies between the EU and other IOs in peacebuilding
at the macro, meso and micro-levels. For each level, the article discusses the situation in
Kosovo, Mali and Armenia.
2. Resource dependency between IOs: macro, meso and micro levels
The starting premise of resource dependence theory is that organisations are embedded
in their environments and depend on external resources to operate and survive (e.g.
Levine and White 1961; Pfeﬀer and Salancik 1978). Resources are scarce and few organisa-
tions produce and control all the resources they need themselves. There are two compo-
nents to dependence: the essentiality of a resource for organizational operation and the
substitutability of the resource with resources from alternative sources (Jacobs 1974, 51).
Organizations want to avoid relying on other organizations for their essential non-
substitutable resources. The core dilemma is thus that organisations are dependent on
each other to operate, but that too much dependence puts their operations at risk.
The extent to which organizations develop their relations is aﬀected by their mutual
dependence and power imbalances (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005). For instance, when
resources are non-speciﬁc and widely available on the market, organizations can engage
in ad hoc exchanges. On the other hand, if resources are essential and speciﬁc, organi-
zations can even opt for vertical integration (Williamson 1979). The institutionalisation of
inter-organisational relations therefore varies and this variation can be usefully captured
in four dimensions: the formalisation of the exchange of resources between organiza-
tions, the intensity of the exchange of resources, the reciprocity in terms of resources, and
the standardization of the exchange of resources (Marrett 1971; Aldrich 1979; see also
Dijkstra 2017).
The resource dependence perspective is therefore an established theory that helps
explain why organizations interact and how their interactions are structured. This also
makes it potentially important for studying relations between the EU and other IOs. Yet
despite a wealth of empirical studies on interactions between IOs, resource dependence
approaches remain relatively rare in international relations (e.g. Biermann 2008, 2015;
Harsch 2015; Biermann and Harsch 2017; Koops 2017). This is puzzling, because if not for
resource dependence theory, then what explains why IOs interact?3 In other words, why
exactly do we empirically witness continuous attempts by the EU and other IOs to reach
synergies and coordinate their activities, such as for example peacebuilding missions in
post-conﬂict countries?
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While all organizations try to avoid becoming overly dependent on others, this is
particularly the case with IOs. Member states worry about the autonomy of IOs, as it may
result in agency loss on the side of the member states or even institutional pathologies
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins et al. 2006). They will try to prevent that IOs obtain
resources through alternative channels thereby increasing their autonomy in relationship to
the membership. Indeed, IOs normally get their resources from their membership with clear
strings attached (Patz and Goetz 2019). In other words, IOs seeking outside resources for the
fulﬁlment of their own mandates is generally considered a second-best option. For some
immaterial resources, such as the legitimacy to engage in peacebuilding (Biermann 2017),
the IOs may have to look elsewhere. But when it comes to material resources, the resource-
rich member states of the EU should be able to provide most themselves.
We argue that the focus on observable and formalized exchange of resources between
IOs provides a too narrow application of resource dependency theory. In other words, if we
are to understand why the EU consistently seeks partnerships, we need instead to amend
the conceptual model underpinning the theory. To be sure, Harsch (2015) has distinguished
between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ cooperation, whereas Gebhard and Smith (2015) have usefully
pointed at the scope of informal cooperation. We propose, however, an all-encompassing
approach. When thinking about resource dependencies between the EU and other IOs, it is
useful to consider diﬀerent levels of interaction: macro, meso and micro-level dependence.
At the macro-level, the EU and other IOs operate independently to achieve their
(limited) mandates, but require each other to achieve overall (broader) objectives (see
Table 1 for examples). The rationale behind macro-level interaction is that many inter-
national problems (e.g. climate change, development or peace and security) are too
large for single IOs to address resulting in a need for collective action. Furthermore,
diﬀerent IOs may have diﬀerent sorts of strengths, expertise and authority (cf. Barnett
and Finnemore 2004). The result is a division of labour between IOs, sometimes explicit
but regularly implicit. These IOs may not need each other on an everyday basis. After all,
in fulﬁlling their (limited) mandates they can rely on the resources of the membership.
Yet in terms of achieving overall objectives (e.g. solving climate change, economic
growth or achieving a sustainable peace), resource dependence is unavoidable: the EU
cannot succeed in its overall objectives without the parallel eﬀort of other IOs. This
creates a relationship of dependence.
By identifying themacro-level, we signiﬁcantly increase the scope of resource dependency
theory. One can argue indeed that this goes beyond the theory in its classic form. At the same
time, a macro-level perspective also speaks to established international relations concepts,
such as role theory (Holsti 1970) or even hierarchies in international relations (Lake 2009).
Among IOs there is a strong implicit sense about which organization can contribute what to
Table 1. Examples of resource dependencies in the area of peace and security at the macro, meso
and micro level.
Macro The EU deploys a military stabilization force and the UN does parallel policing within refugee camps.
Meso The EU makes use of NATO military assets through the Berlin+ agreement.
Micro The EU provides extrabudgetary project funding for OSCE peacebuilding.
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the broader objectives of the international community. The macro-level helps us to explain
why there is considerable coordination, even in the absence of formal resource exchange. IOs
need to coordinate the broader objectives, position themselves and carve out a role for
themselves.
The meso-level focuses instead on institutionalized dependencies between IOs contri-
buting directly to the implementation of the (limited) mandate of other IOs. IOs need one
another, because otherwise they cannot even achieve their own mandates provided to
them by their own member states. For instance, NATO-led forces in Kosovo stand by when
EU police can no longer handle a situation. The level includes many of the examples which
we typically ﬁnd in the literature on inter-organizational relations. This is also the level that
resembles traditional resource dependency theory (e.g. Biermann and Harsch 2017;
McEvoy 2017). Institutionalized dependence indicates a degree of formalization, standar-
dization and continuity (Abbott et al. 2000; see also Dijkstra 2017).
Finally, we can identify micro-level dependencies. These are ad hoc, one-oﬀ, contribu-
tions allowing other IOs to better implement their mandates. For instance, one IO can
provide airlift to another IO. Because resource dependence inevitably touches upon
questions of control, it is not surprising that scholars have found more instances of
micro-level than meso-level dependence (e.g. Harsch 2015; Biermann 2015; Gebhard and
Smith 2015). Particularly the member states of IOs ﬁnd it diﬃcult for IOs to sign formal
agreements with other IOs, if this negatively aﬀects their control. Organizations tend to
value their autonomy, and this is particularly so with IOs which include many diﬀerent
principals. Informal, one-oﬀ, support to other IOs can therefore be more appealing than
formalized dependence at the meso-level (Dijkstra 2017; Vabulas and Snidal 2013).
The remainder of this article provides empirical examples of these dependencies
between the EU and other IOs in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding in post-conﬂict countries
is a policy area in which many IOs normally interact and are dependent on one another.
In Kosovo the EU acts as lead international actor in a politically and geo-strategically
important region, which includes EU candidate countries. Unsurprisingly, its presence in
Kosovo is multi-dimensional and long-term, involving one of the largest EU-led civilian
missions to date. In Mali the EU has deployed operations since 2013 and as such it is
a key supporting actor alongside the UN in another long-term, strategically important
for the EU region. In Armenia the EU is a secondary actor. This case is interesting as it
regards a country strongly dependent on Russian support for its political and economic
survival, where the EU has less leverage and yet an interest to stay engaged due to the
strategic importance of the region, not at least as a result of the ongoing conﬂict with
Azerbaijan. It is also an important case to probe into the EU’s ability to inﬂuence the
peace process in a country, in which the EU has not deployed a CSDP mission. While the
article focuses on these three countries, peacebuilding cannot be seen in isolation of
related regional conﬂicts (respectively with Serbia, in the Sahel and with Azerbaijan). The
three cases are unique in that they provide for strong examples of the three diﬀerent
levels of engagement of the EU with other IOs.
3. Macro-level dependencies
At the macro-level, diﬀerent IOs often provide complementary peacebuilding support to
post-conﬂict countries. This often results in a (informal) division of labour between IOs.
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These IOs may not need each other on an everyday basis to get their work done, yet in
terms of achieving overall objectives, such as a sustainable peace, individual IOs cannot
succeed without the eﬀort of other IOs. This section shows that in all three cases – Kosovo,
Mali and Armenia – there are identiﬁable macro-level dependencies. Some are explicitly
acknowledged, for instance in UN Security Council resolution 1244 which set roles for the
UN and NATO in Kosovo (see McEvoy 2017). Most often, however, macro-level dependen-
cies remain implicit. Nevertheless divisions of labour exist and it is clear that collective
eﬀort of IOs is needed to bring about the objectives of the international community.
3.1. Kosovo and its statehood
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, after having been de
facto independent since 1999 (on the role of IOs: Papadimitriou, Petrov, and Greicevci
2007; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012; Eckhard 2016). Even though statehood remains
contested, the implicit objective of the international community is to provide stability in
a volatile region. Bringing Kosovo (and Serbia) into the orbit of European integration is
an important means, which in turn requires a functioning economy, good neighbourly
relations and professional state institutions.
The EU has been the primary international actor since 2008. The EU has, for instance,
facilitated the high-level political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina since 2011.
Through the EU Special Representative, it has been the main political contact point for
the local authorities. The European Commission has long had a key role in economic
development. It has also led on all pre-enlargement measures since the signing of the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2015. The EU mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has
been monitoring, mentoring and advising the Kosovar rule of law institutions since 2008
(Dijkstra 2011; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012).
The EU nonetheless remains dependent on other international actors. The United
States ultimately guarantees Kosovar independence. NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) has
had troops on the ground since 1999. In addition to providing stability, the NATO
Advisory Liaison Team, situated in the Ministry for Kosovo Security Forces headquarters,
has an advisory role in the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) capacity building (Ministry for
the Kosovo Security Forces 2016).
The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), set up in 1999, continues to play a role. Even
though it was signiﬁcantly downsized after 2008 (Eckhard and Dijkstra 2017) and now only
has several residual functions, UNMIK initially provided the umbrella for other IOs to work
alongside each other (McEvoy 2017). This included the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), OSCE, and also the EU. Apart from UNMIK, the UN system com-
prises several agencies, funds, and programmes, notably the UN Development Programme
(UNDP), which provides support for democratic governance and peacebuilding.
Despite the ﬁercely contested statehood, and the fraught relations between IOs
(notably the EU and UN), at a macro-level we can therefore identify a division of labour
and dependencies. Part of these relationships are formal and deﬁned in UN Security
Council resolution 1244 (McEvoy 2017). Another part has developed informally after
2008. While all IOs implement their own mandates, they are ultimately dependent on
each other to reach the overall objective of providing stability in a volatile region. While
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the EU takes the lead in peacebuilding, it is still dependent on a variety of partners to
succeed in Kosovo.
3.2. Mali and the Sahel
After a military coup in which the Malian President Touré was deposed in 2012 (on the
conﬂict: Down and Raleigh 2013; Bøås and Torheim 2013), an insurgent alliance of
Tuareg nationalists and Islamist groups exploited the disruption of government and
seized several provincial capitals. Following the immediate condemnation by the inter-
national community, the coup-makers and President Touré agreed to an interim govern-
ment. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) then deployed troops
in support of Malian territorial integrity (Oluwadare 2014). This led to a strong interna-
tional involvement with the aims of preserving Malian territorial integrity, disrupting
Islamist terrorism and rebuilding a functional state authority.
While ECOWAS, supported by France, was a key actor in the immediate aftermath of the
coup, authority was quickly transferred to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in April 2013 (UNSC Resolution 2100). MINUSMA acts as an
integrated UN presence and provides a coordinating platform for the international com-
munity (ibid.). MINUSMA now has a wide mandate ranging from providing security, to
reconciliation, and rebuilding of the Malian security sector (UNSC Resolution 2164).
France has been a key actor, carrying out various unilateral military counterterrorism
operations (Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane). The EU launched its EU Training
Mission (EUTM) Mali in February 2013 and the EUCAP Sahel Mali in March 2014 (European
Union 2013, 2014). EUTM provides advice and training to Malian armed forces. It comple-
ments MINUSMA, which is not directly involved with capacity building. EUCAP Sahel Mali
provides advice and training to the diﬀerent components of Malian internal security
forces. The division of labour is, however, less clear, as the MINUSMA Police Component
includes a capacity-building pillar as well. In practical terms, EUCAP has focused mostly on
the strategic and national level training, whereas MINUSMA mainly engages in capacity
building at the tactical level.
The international community is actively involved in Mali. While the diﬀerent IOs work
on their own mandate, the ultimate exit strategy is for the Malian government and
security services to be able to exert their own authority. Even though their interaction is
obvious, the dependencies between MINUSMA and the EU remain implicit. While the EU
Council Decisions refer to the other IOs and stress the need for coordination, they do not
provide a division of labour. This is a clear example of a macro-level dependence which
has not been formalized.
3.3. Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict
Armenia has been in conﬂict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which the international community
recognises as a region of Azerbaijan, for nearly 30 years and both countries have been in
prolonged peace talks in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group (on the conﬂict: Melander
2001; De Waal 2010; Cornell 2017). This remains the principal platform for the peace
negotiations. While the OSCE is a logical institution, it does not have the weight of larger
IOs, such as the EU and UN. The role of the OSCE inmonitoring the conﬂict is limited and not
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permanent. Six monitors routinely deploy to Nagorno-Karabakh and write up a report (De
Waal 2010, 160, 166). Relations between both countries have recently considerably deterio-
rated as a result of the four-day April 2016 war (International Crisis Group 2017).
The EU’s role in addressing the conﬂict is limited. The EUSR for the South Caucasus
supports the Minsk Group (Paul and Sammut 2016, 3), but has no independent role.
Most signiﬁcantly, the EU pays for the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement
of the Conﬂict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), which focuses on civil society thereby
complementing the work of the OSCE. It is also widely recognized that if Armenia and
Azerbaijan were to reach an agreement, the implementation would probably require
donor money and a peacekeeping force. While there are no explicit plans, it is under-
stood that the EU and UN would step in. This gives credibility to the OSCE process.
In addition toOSCE-led peace negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh, the EU and other IOs
are also active in domestic Armenia securitymatters. While the conﬂict with Azerbaijan casts
a shadow over many domestic security sector reforms in Armenia, this is essentially
a separate matter of analysis. Russia remains the most important international actor in
Armenia. Through the Collective Security Treaty Organization and its military base, it is the
ultimate guarantor of the Armenian state. With few friends in the neighbourhood, Armenia
does not have alternatives. The Russian dependence also makes the relations with the EU
complicated, resulting in Armenia walking away from key trade deals.
While the geopolitical situation overshadows domestic security sector reform, it is still
worth to point at the bilateral eﬀorts of the various IOs. Separate from the Minsk Group,
the OSCE oﬃce in Yerevan provides bilateral support with an emphasis on democratisa-
tion and politico-military support. OSCE SSR activities tend to be rather limited and focus
on workshops, study trips, and most prominently the introduction of community-based
policing. The OSCE has also focused on the Armenian police training centre, the police
college and the police academy. Much of the EU eﬀort involves funding the Council of
Europe through a range of projects related to human rights, rule of law, and democratic
governance. This complements the work of the OSCE but remains separate (Council of
Europe 2015). The role of the UN family is largely limited to development assistance.
4. Meso-level dependencies
At the meso-level, diﬀerent IOs institutionalize how they exchange resources and con-
tribute to the implementation of each other’s mandate. While dependencies at the macro-
level often force IOs to develop institutionalized mechanisms to coordinate their actions at
the meso-level, this section shows that on the whole the degree of formal institutionaliza-
tion remains limited. The most obvious dependencies occur when IOs do not have a ﬁeld
presence and rely on other IOs for information as well as security and other enablers. This
has resulted in some form of institutionalized resource exchange.
4.1. Kosovo and its statehood
UNSCR 1244 formally serves as a basis for the division of labour among IOs in Kosovo. In
addition, some memorandums of understanding (MoUs) have been signed, even though
they do not appear as a regular tool for arranging inter-organizational relations. The two
most important meso-level dependencies in Kosovo have to do with day-to-day security
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provided by NATO and the information-sharing between IOs both through formal
reports and coordination meetings.
One key meso-level dependency is the provision of security by NATO. There is
a ‘protocol of understanding’ between the Kosovo Police, the EULEX formed police
units, and NATO about how to address crowd control through a three-tiered response.
According to this protocol, the Kosovo Police acts as the ﬁrst responders. If they are not
capable of addressing the situation EULEX formed police units step in. NATO’s KFOR gets
involved when riots turn into paramilitary violence. While it is a clear example of
a macro-level type of dependency, this protocol of understanding has not been oﬃcially
formalized due to the EU-NATO conundrum (Cyprus-Turkey). In addition to this protocol,
KFOR also provides an ‘evacuation plan’ for UNMIK and EULEX employees ‘in case
something happens’ (interview #6).
To fulﬁl their mandates, IOs in Kosovo are also dependent on each other’s information.
An obvious example is reporting on the situation in north Kosovo, where the EU’s ﬁeld
presence is weaker. The EU Oﬃce therefore makes use of the OSCE and UNMIK presences
in the north for monitoring and reporting, in particular on the position of minorities. The
information from the OSCE and UNMIK monitoring reports is integrated into the reports
that the EU Oﬃce sends to Brussels. There is a similar relationship between the OSCE and
UN, as the OSCE also contributes to the reports of the UN Secretary-General on UNMIK.
Beyond formal reports, information-sharing takes place during coordination meetings.
The best known are UNMIK interagency Monday morning meetings, which originally
brought together all the IOs under the UNMIK umbrella. While these formal coordination
meetings are the most institutionalized form of coordination found in all three cases
studies, they also show the limits of the meso-level institutionalization. From the EU’s side,
they are seen as pre-2008 leftovers and the EU is rarely represented at the level of head of
mission (interviews #6, #9 and #10). In Kosovo, there are also a plethora of coordination
meetings dealing with more practical issues, such as situational relations and staﬃng
(interviews #9 and #10). The EU, EULEX, the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP) and UNMIK have monthly coordination meetings at which
they share information on their work with Kosovo Police. In the rule of law area, UNMIK,
EU Oﬃce, EULEX, OSCE and the United States have their own working group.
4.2. Mali and the Sahel
Following the coup in 2012, a Joint Task Force for Mali was established by the AU,
ECOWAS, the EU and the UN. This task force and the subsequent Support and Follow-up
Group have tried to coordinate a coherent international initial response to the conﬂict
(UNSC Resolution 2100, 3). The overarching framework for international support became
Resolution 2085 and currently Resolution 2164, under which MINUSMA has taken on
responsibility for coordinating international support with respect to the stabilization of
Mali. This is mirrored in the mandates for EUTM and EUCAP Mali, where both missions
are tasked to coordinate and harmonze their actions with MINUSMA and other interna-
tional actors (European Union 2013, article 7(4); European Union 2014, article 2(2)).
Under this framework, extensive formal coordination mechanisms have been estab-
lished between MINUSMA, the EU Delegation, the CSDP missions, and other interna-
tional actors. For instance, the MINUSMA Force Commander and the Commander EUTM
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meet at bi-weekly intervals for coordination (interviews #12, #14 and #19). At lower
levels, an exchange of liaison oﬃcers has been established between MINUSMA Military
HQ and EUTM (interviews #14 and #19). And, to coordinate intelligence assessments,
a direct coordination and exchange of information has been established between EUTM
and the MINUSMA All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU), which is tasked with
collecting and providing military intelligence products to partners, including embassies.
With respect to police, there is a quarterly strategic meeting between EUCAP Head of
Mission and MINUSMA Police Commissioner and a monthly technical meeting between
EUCAP Head of Operations and MINUSMA Deputy Police Commissioner. In addition to
formal and informal meeting structures, liaison oﬃcers have been appointed to improve
communication between the UN and EU missions (interviews #15, #17 and #19).
There is a critical structural dependence between MINUSMA and EUTM for which
both IOs have tried to ﬁnd an institutionalized solution. Both IOs have an interest in the
training of Malian armed forces, by EUTM, to be conducted closer to the actual area of
operations (training on the job). Since EUTM does not have a physical presence beyond
the capital city, it is reliant on MINUSMA to provide logistical support and local facilities
for EUTM to extend its presence into the north-eastern areas of Mali (Gao and Kidal)
(interviews #12, #13, #14 and #19). Yet while the EU has long had this ambition, the
implementation has suﬀered delays, primarily due to the diﬃculty of coordinating the
extensive support required from MINUSMA Mission Support Division (interviews #14 and
#19). It has not been straightforward to put the necessary formalized exchange of
capabilities in place.
Dependency also goes into the other direction. As MINUSMA is conducting missions
with Malian forces, the UN has a signiﬁcant dependency on EUmissions in terms of training
quality. The EU missions have been responsive to suggested training requirements being
put forward by MINUSMA, yet at the same time signiﬁcant concerns have been voiced
towards the lack of on-ground training and follow-up from both CSDP missions. Part of the
problem is the inability of the EU to move around the country, but there is also a strong
emphasis on the risk averseness by EUTM. This undermines eﬀective inter-organizational
relations.
4.3. Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict
While interviewees uniformly commented on the good collaboration of the international
community in Armenia, there are hardly any formal mechanisms for liaison and there is
only a limited interaction between IOs. The division of labour is largely tacit and based
on both path dependence (i.e. who came ﬁrst) and specialized expertise. Perhaps also
because the international engagement is relatively small, actors do not get into each
other’s way and provide largely a complementary eﬀort. There are, however, few meso-
level dependencies.
The most institutionalized forms of dependence are on both extremes of the security-
development nexus. It is uncontested that the OSCE Minsk Group leads the peace
negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh. This creates a focal point for other international
actors. For instance, any time the OSCE Minsk Group meets, the EUSR ﬂies in to have
consultations with all actors in the margins of the meeting. The EUSR supports, in this
respect, the work of the OSCE from a diplomatic standpoint. Lending the weight and
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authority of the EU to the OSCE process – on a continuous basis – provides an important
dependency. At the other side of the spectrum, the development agencies have clearly
worked out proﬁles. Local donor coordination follows standard UNDP template, which is
present in most development countries across the globe, and also involves the local
authorities. There is no formal coordination between the OSCE, EU and Council of
Europe in the area of security sector reform.
5. Micro-level dependencies
Finally, we can identify micro-level dependencies. These are ad hoc, one-oﬀ, contribu-
tions allowing other IOs to better implement their mandates. There are many diﬀerent
ways in which dependencies of IOs occur at the micro-level. Micro-level dependencies
also often substitute meso-level interactions, when IOs cannot come to institutionalized
agreement. Yet signiﬁcant challenges remain with micro-level dependencies, particularly
the ad hoc nature of engagement.
5.1. Kosovo and its statehood
Project funding is an example of how IOs contribute to the mandates of partners.
International actors often co-fund projects or even take over follow-up projects started
by other international actors when they run out of money. In Kosovo, the EU often relies
on project implementing partners, such as the UN agencies and the Council of Europe.
There are no clear guidelines for selecting an implementation partner, but it depends on
the ﬁeld of work and capacities of an international actor. The position of IOs towards the
status of Kosovo also plays an important role. For instance, United Nations Oﬃce for
Project Services (UNOPS) has been selected by the EU to construct integrated border
crossings between Serbia and Kosovo (UNOPS n.d.). Not only for its previous experience,
but also because a UN agency is more acceptable for Serbia.
Despite formal channels, the bulk of communication and information exchange
among international actors in Kosovo runs informally on an ad hoc basis. Crucial for
UNMIK’s relation with the EU was the fact that the latter employed many former UNMIK
staﬀ. On the other hand, interpersonal tensions are said to have made cooperation
between the two missions uneasy at the beginning of the EULEX mandate. Physical
proximity is regarded as important for eﬃcient coordination. The size of Pristina is
deemed to be a factor facilitating communication: ‘This is a small city. They [interna-
tionals] meet in the same restaurants; everyone knows what everyone else is doing’.
On an ad hoc basis, IOs also lend diplomatic support for one another. A speciﬁc
practice identiﬁed could be described as ‘logo switching’. IOs tend to shift visible support
for certain programmes, depending on whom they are primarily seeking to address. The
UN ﬂag is auspicious for the Serbian side, but on the other hand, UNMIK does not enjoy
popularity among central authorities in Pristina. There have been instances of UNMIK and
OSCE co-organising an event, when UNMIK would provide more funding, but only the
OSCE logo would be visible, in order to attract Kosovar institutions. Similarly, the EU may
use its logo to lend support to the other IOs, even if it is not funding their activities. For
instance, the EU provided the Media Justice Transparency Initiative of the OSCE with such
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support, while its contribution was limited to the simple participation of EULEX judges in
panel discussions.
5.2. Mali and the Sahel
As in Kosovo, a wide range of ad hoc and informal exchanges take place between staﬀ
oﬃcers in the diﬀerent missions. For instance, to avoid a potential inﬂation of validity
assessments on duplicate intelligence reports, military analysts informally coordinate
between mission headquarters. There is no formal structure and it is managed on an ad
hoc basis. Similarly, interviewees (#15 and #17) indicated that on a by-project and location
basis ad hoc coordination is conducted between the UN police oﬃcers and EUCAP
experts, where close-coordinated cases meetings takes place several times a week.
Important in terms of micro-level capability dependence is the provision of equipment
for the Malian armed forces. The EU can provide the best possible training, but it does not
have the mandate to provide local forces with equipment. This creates a dependency on
partners. The unilateral ad hoc contributions of individual member states and non-
member states, such as the United States and Switzerland, are particularly signiﬁcant.
This requires informal outreach on the side of the EU to other partners (interview #19).
5.3. Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict
In the case of Armenia, there are also clearly identiﬁable forms of micro-level dependence.
One example is the public support that the EU and the UN provide for the OSCE Minsk
Group. This gives the OSCE additional authority as the only feasible forum for negotia-
tions. For instance, High Representative Federica Mogherini attends all OSCE Ministerial
Council meetings. Similarly, during the April War, she noted that ‘The European Union fully
supports the eﬀorts of the OSCE Minsk Group and the three Co-Chairs’ (Mogherini 2016).
Similarly, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Aﬀairs, Jeﬀrey Feltman (2016) stated
that ‘There is no alternative to a political process as proposed by the Minsk Group Co-
Chairs and to restore trust between the sides’. Such public support is signiﬁcant, also
because it shows the two parties that there is no alternative.
In the area of SSR, the EU is providing signiﬁcant project funding to the Council of
Europe in the area of rule of law and justice. The Council of Europe has become the
implementing partner of choice for the EU in these areas, with the EU making 90% of the
funding available for co-ﬁnanced projects (Council of Europe and European Union n.d.).
While the EU is also the largest funder of OSCE extra-budgetary projects, the EU does
not signiﬁcantly support the OSCE oﬃce in Yerevan in terms of SSR. Indeed, this also
shows that drawback of temporary ad hoc project support. The OSCE staﬀ, in particular,
feel they are underfunded and recall with some nostalgia the times that the EU provided
signiﬁcant funding for the OSCE projects.
6. Conclusion
It is well known that the EU coordinates a lot with other IOs, including on peacebuilding.
In the academic literature, much attention is being paid to the reasons why the EU and
its partners are sometimes (not) successful in coordination and other forms of
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interaction. The discussions about the EU and its partners are furthermore often con-
ceptualized around cooperation, competition and conﬂict.
What much of the literature fails to address are the reasons why the EU consistently
interacts with other IOs in peacebuilding. Indeed, resource dependency theory, the most
convincing account in organization theory explaining why organizations interact seems
diﬃcult to apply to IOs. Whereas this theory stresses the resource dependence of
organizations on their environment, IOs tend to rely mostly on their membership. The
main contribution of this article is therefore to expand the scope of the resource
dependency perspectives and make them applicable to interactions between the EU
and other IOs and thus provide a more nuanced explanation as to the reasons behind
the EU’s cooperative preference.
This article has argued that one needs to account for macro-level and micro-level
dependencies in addition to the more conventional meso-level dependencies. While the
EU in Kosovo, for instance, might not be formally dependent on other IOs – apart from
NATO’s security provisions and UNMIK’s information about northern Kosovo – for the
implementation of its EULEX mission, the EU can only succeed in bringing stability and
progress in Kosovo, if the other IOs are also eﬀective in fulﬁlling their own mandates.
Despite the EU’s extensive commitment, the full challenge of Kosovo is too large for the
EU to address, which has resulted in a division of labour across IOs.
Similar to such macro-level dependencies, we should neither underestimate the impor-
tance of micro-level dependence. While ad hoc, one-oﬀ, contributions by partners might
not be essential for IOs to fulﬁl their core mandate, such contributions are often very
welcome. It has been long stressed that particularly on the ground, there tends to be
a large degree of practicality to interactions between IOs based on informal and personal
relations. Even if not institutionalized through formal and permanent agreements, ad hoc
contributions are often the bit of oil that keep the machinery running.
While this article has given illustrations through insights from Kosovo, Mali and Armenia,
the article also triggers new questions. First, while it is useful to distinguish between these
levels, a key question is how the levels relate to each other. UNMIK, as originally established,
sought to create a formalized division of labour amongst IOs through its pillar structure. This
is where the macro and meso levels intersect. Similarly, there are diﬀerent degrees of
formality that may distinguish between the meso and micro levels. Second, we have not
tried to explain variation across cases within the levels. For instance, macro-level interaction
is more problematic in Kosovo than Mali. At the same time, the pre-accession process in
Kosovo provides a macro-level focal point for the international community. The situation is
less clear in Armenia where the EU is a secondary actor. The new framework we have put
forward should facilitate further research into the dependencies of IOs across the diﬀerent
levels.
Notes
1. The EU itself confusingly uses the term crisis management as an equivalent for the CSDP
missions, whereas most CSDP missions are about post-conﬂict capacity-building and secur-
ity sector reform.
2. These interviews took place in Kosovo (11), Mali (9) and Armenia (9) from November 2016
until March 2017. Interviewees included senior oﬃcials from the EU, UN, OSCE, NATO,
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European embassies, local government and think tanks. These interviews were semi-
structured and the average length was 60 minutes.
3. Constructivist and psychological theories provide alternative accounts, such as the idea of
partnership as an end in itself (Biermann and Koops 2017, 12, 18). We are, however,
concerned with resource dependency theory.
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